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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The question addressed in this paper concerns a phenomenon that, on the sur-
face at least, appears to defy a simple no-arbitrage principle. That is, con-
sider two securities, each of which is issued by the government. One security
represents a risk-free claim against itself, called ‘money.’ The other security
represents a risk-free claim against money, called ‘bonds.’ In an unfettered ﬁ-
nancial market, theory suggests that one of two things should happen: [1] that
the rates of return on these two securities should be equated, if they are to
be willingly held in the wealth portfolios of individuals; or [2] that the higher
return asset should drive the lower return asset out of circulation. As is well
known, this stark prediction appears to be inconsistent with the rate of return
diﬀerential that normally exists between money and bonds. This discrepancy
between theory and facts is known as the coexistence puzzle.
The common explanation for the coexistence puzzle is that money is a ‘spe-
cial’ type of asset. In particular, money provides nonpecuniary ‘liquidity’ ser-
vices that makes it a preferred method of payment relative to other types of
assets. This is the basic idea behind any model that generates a demand for
money by assuming that money enters into the utility (or shopping time) func-
tion or by assuming that some purchases are subject to a cash-in-advance con-
straint. While these ‘short-cut’ methods have their uses, they are ill-suited for
the question at hand since they basically assume away the coexistence puzzle.
Here, I take the view that any satisfactory explanation should be couched in
terms of a model with a physical environment that renders money essential for
trade; e.g., see Kocherlakota (1998).
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1To date, there have been relatively few attempts to address the coexistence
puzzle within the context of a model that features suitable microfoundations.
Perhaps the leading explanation continues to be the ‘legal restrictions’ hypoth-
esis, which I critically evaluate in Section 2. In Section 3, I lay out the basic
framework of my own model without government bonds to highlight the role
played by money in this environment. Section 4 then introduces government
bonds and examines the conditions under which coexistence prevails. Section
5 provides a brief review of some competing theories that have recently been
oﬀered. Section 6 provides a summary and oﬀers suggestions for future research.
2 The Legal Restrictions Hypothesis
One of the ﬁrst and still leading explanations for the coexistence puzzle is the ‘le-
gal restrictions’ hypothesis put forth by Bryant and Wallace (1980) and Wallace
(1983). In the overlapping generations model that they consider, money and
bonds naturally earn the same rate of return. However, the authors highlight
two features of the environment that may prevent this from happening. First,
negotiable bearer bonds tend to be issued in very large denominations. Second,
legal restrictions prevent banks from issuing low denomination banknotes, which
prevents the intermediation of large denomination government debt.
The large denomination property of government debt is only a necessary and
not suﬃcient condition. In particular, a proﬁt maximizing bank could exploit an
existing arbitrage opportunity by issuing its own small denomination notes that
are fully backed by large denomination government bonds. Competition among
banks would presumably drive the return on private banknotes in line with the
return on bonds (with perhaps a small diﬀerential to cover the costs of inter-
mediation). For any strictly positive interest rate, the demand for non-interest
bearing money should then fall to zero. The legal restriction on intermediation
is what prevents this from happening.
The legal restrictions hypothesis has been challenged by those who question
the empirical validity of its two underlying assumptions. Because these chal-
lenges are relevant for my own hypothesis, I take some time here to review them
and evaluate their legitimacy.
Let me consider ﬁrst the assumption that interest-bearing government debt
is issued in large denominations. Some authors have pointed out that there
are a number of historical episodes in which governments have issued ‘low’ de-
nomination interest bearing treasury debt. Makinen and Woodward (1986), for
example, report that during 1915—27, the government of France issued treasury
bills (called bons) in denominations as low as 100 Francs. The bons were is-
sued with terms of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year. Unlike other
interest-bearing bearer debt sold by the French government, bons were contin-
uously available (i.e., they were not sold as periodic subscription issues). The
bons could be obtained at all banks (including branches of the Bank of France),
2post oﬃces, and numerous local oﬃces of the Finance Ministry. To facilitate
their circulation, bons were made bearer notes and no mechanism was created to
assist the government in collecting taxes on any interest earned. Furthermore,
t h eB a n ko fF r a n c es t o o dr e a d yt or e d e e m any paper (presumably for Bank of
France notes) due within 3 months at a discount equal to the prevailing bank
rate. In most of their years of existence, the quantity of bons outstanding was
comparable with the note circulation. But despite the attractive physical and
contractual attributes of bons, and the fact that they earned interest, they did
not drive Bank of France notes out of circulation. On the contrary, bons were
evidently much less liquid than notes.
Makinen and Woodward argue that the bons e p i s o d ei nF r a n c ep r o v i d e se v i -
dence that overturns one of the underlying assumptions of the legal restrictions
hypothesis. But there is reason to doubt this claim. Evidently, the lowest de-
nomination bon was 100 Francs, which by my own calculation is equivalent to
roughly 100 USD today. Other indirect evidence suggesting that the bon was a
larger denomination note is the fact that it was readily used in larger transac-
tions (e.g., real estate).Thus, I do not believe that one can conclude, as Makinen
and Woodward claim, that bons were suitable for ‘everyday exchange.’1 The
same can be said of the ‘low’ denomination interest bearing treasury bills issued
by both the Northern and Southern governments in the United States during
the civil war; see Burdekin and Weidenmier (2002). During this episode, the
minimum denomination interest bearing note issued was $5, which again is ap-
proximately the equivalent of 100 USD today.
At this stage, I conclude that there is no compelling evidence to suggest
that governments have ever issued interest bearing currency in the range of
denominations of their non-interest bearing counterparts. Thus, the assumption
of large denomination bonds appears to be a valid one.
Let me now turn attention to the assumption that banks are legally pro-
hibited from issuing low denomination notes. We know of historical episodes
in which this assumption appears to be invalid. For example, during the so-
called ‘free-banking’ era in the United States (1836—63), most states passed
laws making it relatively easy to establish a state bank and issue low denomi-
nation notes.2 While banks did intermediate government bonds, the notes they
issued (redeemable in specie) generally did not pay interest. Similarly, dur-
ing the Scottish free banking system (1716—1864), while Scottish banks were
not prohibited from issuing low denomination interest bearing notes (again, re-
deemable in specie), they evidently chose not to (although they did pay interest
on demand deposit accounts); e.g., see White (1987). The fact that zero inter-
est notes (and specie) coexisted with higher yielding securities in these eras of
1There were at least two other potentially important legal discrepancies between bons and
notes. First, bons were not legal tender. Second, bons were not redeemable on demand
(whereas large denomination notes could presumably be exchanged for smaller denominations
on demand at the Bank of France).
2Shortly after the National Banking Act of 1863, a 10% tax was imposed on banknotes
and they quickly disappeared from circulation.
3relatively free banking casts some doubt on the legal restrictions hypothesis.
In my view, however, perhaps the clearest evidence that contradicts the sec-
ond assumption of the legal restrictions hypothesis is to be found in most mod-
ern economies with well-developed electronic payment systems. While banks do
not issue low denomination payment instruments in paper form (either willingly
or by legal restriction), they can and do issue highly divisible interest bearing
demand deposits that these days are essentially the electronic equivalent of pri-
vately issued interest bearing paper notes. Unlike the banknotes of old, which
were made redeemable for specie, the electronic bank money of today is made
redeemable for government issued zero interest paper notes (cash). Thus, in
the context of present day economies, the coexistence puzzle may be framed
as asking why cash continues to coexist with what appears to be a dominant
monetary instrument (that is backed, in part, by government bonds).
In the model I develop below, I maintain the assumption that government
interest bearing debt is issued in large denominations, making it unsuitable for
‘everyday’ payments. But I dispense with the assumption that legal restrictions
prevent banks from intermediating large denomination bonds. In the model
below, banks can and do intermediate bonds by issuing a highly divisible ‘elec-
tronic’ interest bearing payment instrument. I replace the legal restriction with
what is arguably a more plausible assumption: That there is a less than com-
plete public record of individual trading histories. This assumption implies that
privately-issued debt instruments are not universally accepted for all types of
payments—a restriction that makes ﬁat money essential for trade. Eﬃciency in
this environment entails the emergence of banks whose assets constitute cash,
bonds and loans; and whose interest-bearing liabilities must be made redeemable
on demand for cash. Bonds earn interest because they must compete with cap-
ital in the wealth portfolios of individuals. Non-interest bearing cash is valued
for its ability to facilitate exchange in trading opportunities where the seller
cannot easily verify the legitimacy of the buyer’s bank instrument.
3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The model developed here is similar to one developed by Smith (2002). Consider
an economy consisting of two separate ‘locations’ A and B. Of course, one
need not interpret ‘locations’ literally as being spatially separated. The key
assumption is that the trading histories of an agent (or agency) belonging to
A are not observable by those agents (or agencies) belonging to B; and vice-
versa. This restriction on the environment implies that private liabilities issued
in location A are not recognized in location B (and vice-versa). Each location
is populated by Nt young agents at date t =1 ,2,...,∞ w h ol i v ef o rt w op e r i o d s .
There is an initial old generation N0 in each location. Let n denote the (gross)
rate of population growth.
Each young agent is relocated to the ‘other’ location with probability 0 <
4π<1. One can interpret this event as the probability of being confronted with a
trading opportunity in which the buyer and seller (and their respective banks)
are anonymous to each other (so that privately-issued liabilities are not an
acceptable form of payment). In what follows, I will refer to π as the probability
of a ‘liquidity shock.’ Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, π also represents
the fraction of young agents making a transition to a ‘foreign’ location. Hence,
the young (in location A) have an expected utility function:
U =( 1− π)u(cA)+πu(cB), (1)
where u0 > 0 >u 00 and cj denotes consumption in location j = A,B (the young
in location B have similar preferences).
Young individuals are endowed with y>0 units of output. There is an
investment technology that takes k units of current output and delivers xk
units of future output, where x>n .The investment choice must be made
before the realization of the liquidity shock. Assume that capital is too costly
to scrap so that it cannot be transported across locations. As well, assume that
capital depreciates fully after yielding its return. Young agents only care about
consumption when old (so that they save their entire endowment).
Since capital cannot be scrapped and since private liabilities are not accepted
in foreign locations, there is a role for ﬁat money. Assume that the initial old of
each location are endowed with a stock of ﬁat money M. The supply of money
is held constant over time, so that it earns a real (gross) return equal to n. Note
that money will be valued (for its insurance properties) despite being dominated
in rate of return.
Since the young save their entire endowment, the only relevant choice is
over the composition of their savings; i.e., money (q) or capital (k). Since the
portfolio decision must be made before an agent experiences a liquidity shock,
the young have incentive to form a coalition (which I will call a bank). The bank
takes deposits y, which it uses to purchase money (from the old), investing the
remainder in the location speciﬁc capital project. Formally, the bank’s choice
problem is to maximize (1) subject to:
(1 − π)cA + πcB ≤ xk + nq;
πcB ≤ nq;
where q + k = y.
Since x>n ,the second constraint will bind. In this case, the equilibrium












Note that the nominal interest rate is positive; i.e. (x/n) > 1. Andolfatto (2004)
demonstrates that holding the stock of money constant is an optimal monetary
5policy (from the perspective of a representative young generation). In other
words, the Friedman rule is not optimal in this environment. The intuition is
straightforward. While generating a deﬂation to equate the return on capital
and money has the beneﬁt of providing full insurance, this gain is more than
oﬀset by the implied contraction in capital spending (as banks divert deposits
away from business loans and into ﬁat money).
4 Adding Government Bonds
There is an outstanding stock of nominal government bonds B that are in the
hands of the initial old. Assume that these bonds have no maturity date, but
that they are transferable (across generations) and pay a nominal (gross) interest
rate R. The government’s policy is to maintain a ﬁxed bond/money ratio θ ≡
(B/M). Interest payments on the debt are ﬁnanced with a lump-sum tax on
bond-holders.
Let b denote the real bond holdings per young agent. Then the bank’s choice
problem is to maximize (1) subject to:
(1 − π)cA + πcB ≤ xk + Rnb + nq − τ;
πcB ≤ nq.
where τ is a lump-sum tax. Note that this speciﬁcation assumes that government
bonds are issued in suﬃciently large denominations that prohibit bank money
from being redeemable in government bonds (when I go to the bank machine,
the ATM spits out non-interesting bearing cash, not small denomination notes
of interest-bearing government debt).3
If bonds are to compete with capital, the nominal interest rate must be such
that R∗ =( x/n) > 1. Note that since the equilibrium price level falls at rate
n, both bonds and capital earn the same real return x. In this case, the bank
is indiﬀerent between bonds and capital, so that s ≡ b + k = y − q.T h e t h e
bank’s choice problem is therefore given by:
max
q (1 − π)u
µ








The demand for real money balances is characterized by:
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3If bonds are issued in small denominations, then the second constraint would be given by:
πcB ≤ xb + nq.
In this case, money would be driven out of circulation.
6From the government’s budget constraint:
τ =( x − 1)b.
Since θ ≡ b/q, we can alternatively write this constraint as:
τ =( x − 1)θq.
Substituting this constraint into condition (2) yields a condition that character-
izes the equilibrium real money balances:
xu0
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Note that if θ =0 , then the model reduces to the earlier speciﬁcation.
Let me now summarize the pattern of trades in this economy. The ‘initial’ old
are endowed with M dollars of currency and B dollars of interest bearing debt.
After paying the lump sum tax (that ﬁnances the interest cost of outstanding
government bonds), the initial old are left with M + B dollars. Banks collect
deposits from each of the initial young (consisting of claims against y). A portion
of these claims are used to purchase the M + B dollars of government debt
instruments from the old. The remainder of these claims are used to ﬁnance
capital investment.
Thus, on the asset side of its balance sheet, the bank holds government
cash, government bonds, and private loans (claims against the economy’s capital
stock). Eﬃciency dictates that the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet
consist of demandable debt (demand deposits). One can think of demandable
debt consisting of electronic transactions balances that can be redeemed on
demand for government cash. These demandable debt instruments serve as
a private money instrument. If depositors choose to exercise the redemption
option (i.e., withdraw funds early), then they receive government cash but earn
no interest on their savings. Depositors who carry their savings at the bank into
the future period use the principal and interest to purchase future output.
After the realization of individual liquidity shocks in the current period, the
bank’s cash balances are drained entirely by those who need to exercise the
redemption option on their demand deposits. This cash is taken to the ‘foreign’
location where it is used to purchase output in the future period. Of course,
there is an equal amount of cash arriving in the ‘domestic’ location from the
young on the ‘foreign’ location who exercised the redemption option on their
demand deposits. Thus, the total supply of government cash remains constant
in each location.
As time unfolds, the young become old. Those that have cash, purchase
claims to output (issued by the new bank that arises in that period). Those
that still have their bank money use it to purchase output. Some of this output
consists of the return to capital investment and some of this output consists of
the endowment brought into the period by the new generation of young agents.
7This latter output is purchased by selling B dollars of government bonds (the
amount remaining after satisfying the tax obligation) to the bank representing
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5 Discussion
In this model, interest-bearing government debt coexists with non-interest-
bearing government money, despite the fact that private intermediaries are
not legally restricted from issuing small denomination banknotes. The model
does not explain why the government would want to issue large denomination
interest-bearing debt. But given that it does, the model here explains the in-
terest premium as follows:
81. Government bonds are issued in large denominations, so that ATMs can-
not spit out low-denomination government notes that pay interest;
2. While banks can and do intermediate large denomination government
notes by issuing private liabilities that are backed by government bonds,
these private liabilities are not an acceptable form of payment in some
transactions (e.g., when I try to pay for groceries in New York with a
check drawn on my bank in San Francisco).
Given that history appears to provide no examples of governments that have
issued interest bearing notes in the range of denominations available in their non-
interest bearing counterparts, the coexistence of money and bonds should not
be surprising. However, there is a subtler dimension to the coexistence puzzle
that concerns the coexistence of money and bonds of identical denominations
(e.g., a 100 Franc Bank of France note and a 100 Franc bon). To explain this
phenomenon, one needs to dispense with Fact 1.
As it turns out, I think that a plausible reinterpretation of the model devel-
oped above can explain the coexistence puzzle even in the absence of Fact 1. In
order to do so, however, we need to take seriously a dimension that has been
largely neglected in modern theories of money; namely the legal/contractual
properties of diﬀerent monetary instruments. An almost universal property of
all government money is that it constitutes legal (or lawful) tender;s e eB r e c k -
enridge (1903). The phenomenon is too pervasive to be interpreted as mere
coincidence or irrelevant custom. It seems more likely to suppose that this legal
provision has at least some bite; i.e., at least some payments at some level need
to be settled in terms of the economy’s legal tender.4
Unlike the notes issued by the Bank of France, the bon was not made legal
tender (why not?). In the context of the model developed above, we might
imagine that the ‘liquidity shock’ corresponds to a transaction opportunity that
requires payment in legal tender. Note that the probability of this liquidity
shock can be made arbitrarily small (as long as it remains strictly positive).
With this simple reinterpretation, the coexistence of similarly denominated bills
with diﬀerent pecuniary returns can be explained.
6 Alternative Explanations
1. White (1987).
2. Aiyagari, Wallace, Wright (1996).
4To the extent that the legal tender status of government money has bite, one might
question whether ‘unbacked’ government money should in fact be interpreted as ﬁat, since a
legal tender note has the power to discharge a real tax obligation; see Goldberg (2004). On
the issue of whether a purely ﬁat money has ever existed at all, see Goldberg (2003).
9Shi (2003) considers a model with the following features. The (search) en-
vironment is such that ﬁat money is essential. In addition to ﬁat money, the
government issues one-period treasury bills (bonds) that are redeemable upon
maturity at face value. Bonds are assumed to be divisible, so that Facts 1 and
2 play no role. There is a temporary spatial separation between the period’s
goods market and the market for newly issued bonds, precluding the latter from
being used in payment for goods, so that newly issued bonds sell at a discount.
At maturity, bonds may be redeemed at face value or held as a monetary instru-
ment (precluding future redemption). The main question asked is under what
conditions do matured bonds circulate along with money.
Since matured bonds share precisely the same physical and legal charac-
teristics of ﬁat money, Shi ﬁnds that money and (matured) bonds coexist as
media of exchange (with identical rates of return). However, by introducing an
exogenous (arbitrarily small but positive) probability that bonds are not accept-
able as payment in all goods transactions, bonds are driven out of circulation.
This probability is interpreted by Shi as an individual’s chance encounter with
a government agency that is instructed to accept only government ‘cash’ as
payment for services rendered (or tax obligation discharged). Another way to
think about this is as I have done above; i.e., that some payments have to be
made in the economy’s legal tender (which does not include bonds). In this
equilibrium, bonds do not circulate in equilibrium and newly issued bonds sell
at a discount because an exogenous market separation that makes bonds less
liquid than money.
Shi’s explanation for the coexistence puzzle is somewhat diﬀerent than my
own. In my model, government bonds trade at a discount (earn interest) be-
cause they must compete with private capital if they are to be willingly held in
individual wealth portfolios. As well, the bonds is my model do circulate in the
same sense as ﬁat money does (i.e., by passing from generation to generation).
There is also another sense in which the bonds in my model serve as money.
In particular, while the bonds themselves are not held directly by any individ-
ual, an intermediated private money instrument backed in part by these bonds
is. In other words, intermediation converts government bonds into a form of
money. However, unlike government money, this private money is not accept-
able in all types of exchanges, which accounts for the rate of return diﬀerential.
Furthermore, my model suggests that if the government was to issue bonds in
denominations similar to cash (and render such bonds legal tender), the demand
for government non-interest bearing debt would fall to zero.
Zhu and Wallace (2003) view coexistence as one of many possible equilibrium
outcomes that may occur in bilateral exchanges involving goods and two ‘out-
side’ assets (money and bonds). I do not understand this paper. An equilibrium
with coexistence appears to rely on the idea that there may be a ‘convention’
(an equilibrium selection) such that a buyer’s bargaining power is increased with
the amount of cash (as opposed to bonds) brought into an exchange. In this
equilibrium, individuals are willing to hold cash (which is dominated in rate of
10return) since it allows them to extract a greater fraction of the surplus associated
in any exchange opportunity. However, this same environment also generates
outcomes that do not distinguish between money and bonds and outcomes that
reverse the role of bonds and money. Wallace (2003) claims not to bothered by
such multiplicity (or the fact that the unique equilibrium in a large economy
does not feature coexistence). I am not bothered by multiplicity either, but I
ﬁnd their interpretation of the coexistence puzzle somewhat of a stretch.
7P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s
optimal policy: small denomination bonds — Friedman rule (suboptimal).
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